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Maritime affairs are of great importance to the 
world economy, which is why the security of this 
area is of the utmost importance. Maritime security 
can be disrupted in a number of ways, and in this 
paper the greatest emphasis is placed on 
underwater security. Although states are making 
efforts to safeguard maritime and underwater 
security, there is still plenty of room to raise 
underwater security to a much higher level. 
Keywords: Maritime, underwater, security, critical 
infrastructure, protection. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 2019), maritime transport is an 
essential branch of the world economy, because it accounts 
for almost 90% of worldwide trade. During 2018, around 11 
billion tonnes of goods have been transported worldwide by 
sea. This form of transport and trade is the most cost-effective 
and most economical compared to the transportation of goods 
and people by air and land. 
Due to its economy and cost-effectiveness, which enables the 
transportation of goods (which consequently provide better 
services) to all parts of the world, maritime transport is the key 
to the sustainable and constant development of the global 
economy, and it contributes to the eradication of economic 
deprivation and inequality worldwide. 
According to UNCTAD international maritime transport and 
trade have been growing year by year, and in 2018 it has 
increased by 2.7 percent compared to 2017. UNCTAD 
announced that international maritime traffic will be in the 
constant positive raise in the period from 2020 to 2024. 
1.1 MARITIME SAFETY THREATS 
Maritime safety threats can be divided into two categories: 










































 1.1.1 DELIBERATE MARITIME OFFENSES  
In the domain of deliberate delicts, we include acts of 
terrorism, piracy, sabotage, organized crime, etc. 
As the target, terrorist actors in the maritime sector can take 
ports, ships, bridges, oil rigs, pipelines, and all other facilities 
that are somehow connected to the sea and maritime 
industry. According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
377 maritime-related incidents occurred from 1970 to 2018. 
 
Picture 1. Maritime terrorist attacks, period from 1970 to 2018 
 
The proportion of terrorism-related incidents in the maritime 
sector is up to 2% of the total number of committed terrorist 
acts, but the consequences of such acts remain far greater 
than the acts of terrorism committed ashore. One reason for 
this is the fact that executing a terrorist act successfully at sea, 
especially in undersea regions, requires extremely good 
preparation and good logistics. 
Acts of piracy and attempted robbery are also present in 
maritime affairs, and from 2008 to 2017 there were 3016 such 
acts (Tumbarska, 2018). 
Organized crime in the domain of trafficking in persons, drugs, 
weapons, and other illicit substances is also present in 
maritime traffic, and these offenses can be committed using 






















































(small submarines, autonomous underwater vehicle, etc.) 
(UNODC, 2013). 
1.1.2. MARITIME ACCIDENTS 
A maritime accident is a specific, identifiable, unexpected, 
unusual and unintentional event caused or related to a 
maritime object that results in material and/or human 
casualties. 
Each maritime accident has its cause and each must be 
viewed separately and in the context in which it occurred. A 
maritime accident can occur for a variety of reasons, some of 
which include: sensory system errors, errors in data 
interpretation, human errors (inexperience, etc.), inadequate 
surveillance, or inadequate safety-at-sea (Prodan; Stošić, 
2018). 
2. CRITICAL UNDERWATER INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
HAZARDS 
2.1 PORT FACILITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
The security of the port and port areas is an important aspect 
of the security of a particular state and interstate community 
as a whole. Ports and port areas are potentially attractive 
target for terrorist organizations and organized crime groups 
due to the flow of large numbers of people and goods. 
Jemaah Islamiyah, Tamil Tigers, and Al-Qaeda have 
underwater terrorist capability and professionally trained 
underwater attacking teams (Prodan, 2017). 
The biggest threats to the underwater security of port critical 
infrastructure are autonomous underwater vehicles, 
professionally trained swimmers and divers, and they all can 
attack by using explosive devices and in any other way. 
Targets of the port attacks can be the ships themselves or 
critical infrastructure of the port (berths, pontoons, coastal 
areas, etc.). 
2.2 UNDERWATER SHIP PARTS  
Due to their operational nature, ships are very attractive 
targets to terrorists, extremists and other actors as they 
transport valuable resources and/or passengers. Ships are an 









































 in potentially big human and material casualties, and/or big 
ecological disaster. Ships can also be interesting to destroy 
because the ship can be perceived as a state symbol. The 
consequences described here represent a security threat to 
the economy at national and international levels for the legal 
order as a whole. 
Terror and sabotage acts on underwater ship parts cannot 
and should not be separated from the security threats to the 
port infrastructure. By their nature, ships spend a certain 
period of their life in ports, which is why there is an 
interdependence between the protection of the port, port 
areas, and underwater ship parts. 
Ship sabotage and assault carried from underwater can be 
done by divers, swimmers or personnel who remotely operate 
autonomous underwater vehicles. Each of the actors involved 
in the sabotage or assault can use limpet mines, and the 
same mines are relatively easy to handle since the smallest 
variants can weigh only two kilograms. For example, we can 
take the VS-SS-22 (Valsellina), limpet mine which can destroy 
a ship that weighs 400 tons and do serious damage to the 
ship of up to 1500 tons. Valsellina weighs only 20 kilograms 
of which 10-12 is explosive. (Croatian MoD, 1995)  
A new generation of limpet mines (and the old ones that can 
easily be upgraded to modern standards), from the 
perspective of members of terrorist organizations, have many 
advantages compared to other explosive devices and 
sabotage methods. The terrorists see the benefits of using 
limpet mines in the following:  
• demining requires a certain amount of time and proper 
professional training, 
• multiple people can quickly set up large numbers of 
mines, 
• setting up the timer and connecting it to all mines can 
produce a simultaneous explosion, causing massive 
casualties to a ship, port infrastructure or human 
casualties (Murphy, 2007). 
Public awareness of the underwater acts of terrorism 
manifested itself in 2002 when reports came to the media that 
Al-Qaeda is preparing divers and that they are planning an 
attack on US warships that visit the Indonesian ports. In 2005, 






















































revealed that he had been hired and sent to training where he 
was preparing for underwater terrorist activities (Murphy, 
2007). 
Recent activities in the Gulf of Oman are a real example of 
using limpet mines for maritime sabotage purposes. On May 
12, 2019, four merchant ships were damaged by such 
attacks, and the quick response of the world stock market 
manifested itself in soaring of crude oil prices. This attack is 
an example of the extremely rapid and significant impact of 
security hazards on the economy as a whole and exemplifies 
that preventive activities and enhanced security measures in 
the field of underwater security are very important to achieve 
adequate underwater security protection. (UNSC, 2019). 
2.3 OFFSHORE INFRASTRUCTURE  
Offshore research, oil, gas and other exploitation platforms 
and wind farms represent critical infrastructure and they are 
an important segment of energy security of a particular state. 
The security of offshore facilities is part of the state national 
energy security, and it is also of interest to the international 
community as a whole. 
Between 1975 and 2010, about 60 attacks, unlawful 
interferences, and security incidents related to offshore 
facilities were reported (Kashubsky, 2011). Swimmers and 
divers (alone or in a "sabotage group") and an autonomous 
underwater vehicles pose potential security threats to an 
offshore facility because they can place an explosive device 
on the construction above the water lines or they can perform 
a sabotage act within the underwater part of the facility 
(attacks on underwater structures, on pipes through which 
oil/gas flows, etc.). 
Due to the operational nature of the oil/gas platforms, any 
sabotage, explosive device activation, or deliberate fire 
setting can have devastating consequences on the 











































Picture 2. Illustration of the consequences of a security-
compromised offshore facility (oil platform)  Source: Wikimedia 
Commons 
2.4 UNDERWATER PIPELINES 
Underwater pipelines are used for the transmission of oil and 
gas and in some cases water. A fluid that passes through the 
pipeline makes them a critical infrastructure, and any 
obstruction to the oil and gas flow poses a security threat to 
the millions of citizens in the particular area of pipeline supply. 
There are estimates that the value of oil production from 
offshore wells alone exceeds $ 300 billion a year (Wrathall, 
2010). Also, any security risk or threat in the domain of 
underwater pipelines used for oil and gas transmission is a 
potential environmental catastrophe that hurts the 
environment and the national and international economy.  
The safety risk for underwater pipelines is primarily the nature 
of the material that is used to build pipelines and the nature of 
the environment in which the pipeline is installed. The natural 
erosion of the materials of which the pipelines are built, 
changes in the sea soil, earthquakes, tsunamis, and similar 
events are of great security importance for the maintenance 
and pipeline sustainability. Also, the demanding and difficult 
maintenance of pipelines in inaccessible underwater areas 
that are difficult to dive into represents an additional challenge 
in achieving the effective sustainability of the entire system. 
Obsolete pipes already weakened by natural processes 
represent an easier target for attack than pipes recently 






















































Also, the potential safety risk is posed by fishing boats and 
boats that unlawfully anchor near such installations. Heavy 
fishing nets used for bottom trawling or heavy anchors can 
pose a safety problem for pipelines. 
2.5 UNDERSEA CABLES AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
Undersea cables are a vital skeleton of informatization (World 
Wide Web), digitalization (financial services, operation of 
state institutions, global trade, etc.), electricity supply, etc. and 
as such are of great strategic importance for the global 
economy. Commercial underwater communication cables 
carry about 97% of intercontinental electronic 
communications and as such are extremely tempting and 
vulnerable to acts of terrorism, illegal fishing activities, illegal 
anchoring, cyber-attacks, etc. (Green; Burnett, 2008); 
(Wrathall, 2010). 
Sabotage activities of undersea cables can affect critical 
economic and financial national and interstate affairs. Also, 
undersea cables can be vulnerable to intelligence and 
espionage actions by states, groups, and individuals by 
compromising electronic data, and those activities are a threat 
to political stability and order of states and they can 
compromise international relations (DNI, 2017) ; (Matis, 
2012). 
 
Picture 3. Diver during inspection of underwater cable 









































 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDERSEA ACTIVITIES 
All undersea systems share certain characteristics that make 
them extremely important and place them in the category of 
critical processes/infrastructure. An undersea operating 
environment is physically extremely demanding. Water that 
slows down movement, pressure, environmental salinity, etc. 
often offers distorted, incomplete and ambiguous information, 
and without proper equipment, it is almost impossible to 
interpret that information. Even when information is properly 
collected, the problem lays in the transfer of information to 
land (to the human). Transmission problems are especially 
present in the modern undersea systems because critical 
infrastructure is placed at ever greater depths (Wrathall, 
2010). 
Undersea sabotage and assault differ from land sabotages 
and assaults. The undersea environment allows the attacker 
to be more inconspicuous when performing the act (the 
attacker is operating near the target, he is unnoticed and he 
will more likely to bypass defensive measures), and after the 
offensive act, the attacker will have relatively easy way out of 
the action zone (Wrathall, 2010). For the country where the 
act was executed, undersea acts often result in the inability to 
prosecute those responsible because of difficulties in locating 
the object that was used in an attack, and the perpetrator 
himself. 
Also, all construction and defense activities in the sub-sea are 
economically and technically challenging, while sabotage 
and/or attack activities are relatively inexpensive, and with a 
good organizational structure of assault teams are very easily 
realizable. Modern autonomous underwater vehicles 
achieved worrying features - the basic models cost only a few 
hundred US dollars, and some "mid-cost underwater vehicle" 
is about 90 centimeters long, with no additional surface 
accessories, can dive about 300 meters and can develop 























































Picture 4. Autonomus underwater vehicle 
Izvor: Wikimedia Commons 
4. PROPOSAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
UNDERWATER SAFETY GUIDELINES 
4.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING GROUP FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF UNDERWATER SECURITY PROPOSALS 
In order to operationalize security proposals and measures, it 
would be desirable to set up the working group for the purpose 
of underwater security and to forward its proposals to the  
European Commission, IMO, IHO and other relevant maritime 
and safety organizations. 
4.2 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE AND 
REVISION OF ISPS REGULATIONS 
In order for the safety solutions to be implemented, they need 
to be legally standardized in international and national 
legislation governing maritime safety. In this regard, 
amendments to the ISPS rules would be proposed, with 
particular attention to underwater security. 
4.3 INTERDISCIPLINARY  AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACH TO PROVISION OF SECURITY PLANS AND 
ASSESSMENTS 
For each individual ship and critical infrastructure facility 









































 a security assessment and based on that conclusions develop 
a security plan for the specific facility. Given the complexity of 
the risks and dangers that may come from undersea, security 
assessments and plans would be made by a team of experts 
on interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary principles. 
4.4 APPLIED FORENSICS 
Forensic science could be used in the underwater security 
aspect as a preventative tool with the help of which the 
hazards and risks threatening protected objects could be 
predicted, based on previous forensic practice and in the 
specific case of possible threat scenarios. 
4.5 UNDERWATER TEHNICAL PROTECTION 
Implementation of up-to-date techical security solutions in 
order to increase the safety of the subsea. This equipment 
would be used to monitor safety-indicative activities in the 
underwater area near critical infrastructure facilities. 
4.6 FORMATION OF UNDERWATER PROTECTION TEAMS 
Formation of underwater security teams that would assess 
the underwater security of ports, ships, offshore objects 
(platforms, etc.) and will develop and implement security 
plans for these critical infrastructure facilities.  
4.7 EDUCATION OF CREW AND STAFF THAT ARE 
INCLUDED IN MARITIME, UNDERWATER AND PORT 
SAFETY PROCESSES AND ACTIVITIES 
Given the introduction of new technologies and procedures, it 
would be necessary to provide training for all participants in 




























































Maritime affairs and its security are of high importance to the 
world economy, as almost 90% of the world's trade is done by 
the seas. There are numerous safety threats to maritime 
transport, as evidenced by the fact that in the last 50 years 
377 terrorist incidents have been linked to maritime affairs. 
Also, there are numerous acts of domestic organized crime 
and piracy, and they number surpass terrorist acts by multiple 
times. 
Critical maritime (undersea) infrastructure is an attractive 
terrorist target, but even though the state is taking action and 
measures for undersea risk mitigation, there is still room for 
greater improvement. There are numerous scenarios of 
underwater attacks on critical infrastructure and ships, and 
one of the most striking examples is the limpet mine attack in 









































 merchant ships, which prompted an immediate rise in the 
global crude oil price. 
In addition to the assault targets already stated, the target 
may be offshore objects, undersea pipelines, and underwater 
cables. The consequences of possible attacks on those 
targets are multiple because they represent critical 
infrastructure and are of particular importance for the 
economy and security of the state. Underwater attacks are 
vastly different from land attacks, and with the advancement 
of technology, they become relatively inexpensive and, with 
good organizational structure, are relatively easy to perform. 
In the light of all that has been elaborated, we consider it 
necessary to continue theoretical and practical research into 
this area of safety and to develop guidelines for raising the 
level of undersea security for which purpose we propose the 
following: 
• setting up a working group to develop proposals for 
underwater security and forward its proposals to the 
European Commission, IMO, IHO and other relevant 
maritime and safety organizations, 
• drafting national and international legislation and 
revising ISPS regulations, 
• use an interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary approach when 
making security plans and assessments, 
• develop models of underwater forensics through applied 
forensics, 
• use of modern underwater technical protection, 
• formation of underwater protection teams, 
• training crews and personnel involved in maritime, 
underwater and port security. 
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